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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
)
DUB DEAN TUNSTALL,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
____________________________________)

NO. 46412-2018
TWIN FALLS COUNTY
NO. CR-2003-9875

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Dub Dean Tunstall appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion to correct
an illegal sentence. Mr. Tunstall contends the district court erred when it denied his I.C.R. 35(a)
motion to correct an illegal sentence because Mr. Tunstall was never informed that he did not
have to speak to the PSI investigator, and the district court sentenced him without first obtaining
a neuropsychological evaluation. Mindful of State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, 65 (2015) (holding
that an illegal sentence is one that is illegal from the face of the record, does not involve
significant questions of fact, and does not require an evidentiary hearing), Mr. Tunstall asserts
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that his sentence was illegal because a redacted Presentence Investigation (PSI) was required, his
initial sentencing was unfair and constitutionally violative because there had not been a
neuropsychological examination performed, and these errors require a new sentencing hearing,
with a different judge.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In 2004, Mr. Tunstall entered an Alford plea of guilty of one count of rape. (Supp.
R., pp.14, 19.)

He was sentenced to twenty-five years, with eighteen years fixed.

(Supp.

R., pp.14, 54.) Mr. Tunstall filed a Rule 35 motion for leniency, which was denied. (Supp.
R., p.54.) Mr. Tunstall appealed the denial of the Rule 35 motion, but that decision was affirmed
on appeal. (Supp. R., p.54.)
In 2018, Mr. Tunstall filed a motion seeking relief under I.C.R. 35(a), asserting that the
district court erred in imposing his sentence due to constitutional violations during sentencing.
(Supp. R.1, pp.19-23.) Mr. Tunstall asserts that he was not told by counsel that he did not have
to speak with the PSI Investigator. (Supp. R., p.20.) Mr. Tunstall asserts that the constitutional
violations by the State, court, and particularly defense counsel, rise to the level of a fundamental
error which mandates a re-sentencing. (Supp. R., p.21.) Mr. Tunstall also asserts that allowing
him to be sentenced with these errors was inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair
procedure, which violate his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and his Sixth
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.
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(Supp. R., p.21.)

Mr. Tunstall

The Idaho Supreme Court ordered the clerk’s record in this case to be augmented with the
records in the prior appeals, Nos. 31271 and 42185, and for a limited clerk’s record to be
prepared in this case which contains the documents requests in this notice of appeal. That
Limited Clerk’s Record shall be referred to in this Appellant’s Brief as the Supplemental Record
(“Supp. R.”).
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submitted a supporting affidavit in which he affirmed that he did not know that he could retain
his right to remain silent throughout the presentence investigation and interview, and, had he
known, he would not have filled out the PSI questionnaire or spoken to the investigator. (Supp.
R., p.33-34.) This failure by counsel constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. (Supp.
R. pp.21, 33-34.)

As a remedy, Mr. Tunstall sought a new PSI, a neuropsychological

examination, and a re-sentencing hearing, with conflict counsel appointed to assist him. (Supp.
R., pp.22-27.)
Mr. Tunstall also filed a motion and affidavit in support, seeking to redact all of the
statements he made to the presentence investigator from the PSI, and alternatively moved the
district court to voluntarily disqualify itself. (Supp. R., pp.31-34.) He filed a motion and a
supporting memorandum seeking a neuropsychological examination.

(Supp. R., pp.35-48.)

Mr. Tunstall filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing. (Supp. R., p.51.)
The district court denied Mr. Tunstall’s Rule 35(a) motion. (Supp. R., pp.58-63.) In
denying the motion, the court noted that Mr. Tunstall was seeking to have the court reevaluate
the facts underlying his sentencing, but that is outside the scope of Rule 35(a). (Supp. R., pp.5960.) The court determined that the motion fell under Rule 35(b), and Mr. Tunstall was untimely,
as he was required to file a Rule 35(b) motion within 120 days of the entry of the judgment of
conviction. (Supp. R., pp.60-61.) The district court similarly found it did not have jurisdiction
to rule on the: (1) Motion for Confidential Neuropsychological Examination at Public Expense;
(2) Motion to Redact Presentence Investigation Report and Alternative Motion for Possible
Disqualification of Court Under Circumstances Stated Hereto Attached Motions and Pleadings;
(3) Motion for Forma Pauperis with Attached Affidavit of Poverty; (4) Motion and Affidavit in
Support for Appointment of Counsel—Conflict Counsel outside Public Defenders Office; (5)
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Motion to Docket; (6) Motion for Evidentiary Hearing; (7) Motion for Status Hearing; (8)
Motion for Telephonic Hearing of Via vision in Support of Any Further Status Procedures, with
presence of Court Appointed Conflict Counsel; (9) Motion for Transport for any Court Ordered
Proceedings if necessary; and (10) Order Granting Motion for Transport (Proposed Order), so
denied these motions. (Supp. R., pp.61-62.)
Mr. Tunstall timely appealed from the order denying his motions.2 (Supp. R., pp.64-67,
85-88.)

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Tunstall’s Motion To Correct An Illegal Sentence?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Tunstall’s Motion To Correct An Illegal Sentence

A.

Introduction
Mr. Tunstall asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motions. Mindful of

the decision in State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, 65 (2015) (holding that an illegal sentence is one
that is illegal from the face of the record, does not involve significant questions of fact, and does
not require an evidentiary hearing), Mr. Tunstall asserts that the district court erred by denying
his motion to correct an illegal sentence.
Mr. Tunstall respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order denying his motion to
correct an illegal sentence and order that his case be remanded to a different district court judge
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This Appellant’s Brief will address the district court’s error in denying the Rule 35(a) motion,
as it is the dispositive issue.
4

with instructions to order the PSI redacted, to order a neuropsychological evaluation, and to
resentence him.

B.

Standard Of Review
Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) permits a district court to correct an illegal sentence at any

time. State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 84 (2009). “[T]he term ‘illegal sentence’ under I.C.R. 35
is narrowly interpreted as a sentence that is illegal from the face of the record, i.e., does not
involve significant questions of fact or require an evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 86. Generally,
whether a sentence is illegal or was imposed in an illegal fashion is a question of law, over which
an appellate court exercises free review. Id. at 84.

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Tunstall’s Motion To Correct An Illegal
Sentence
It is Mr. Tunstall’s contention that he is entitled to a resentencing because the trial court

imposed a sentence that is illegal on the face of the record where he was never informed that he
did not have to speak to the PSI investigator, and he was sentenced absent a neuropsychological
evaluation. (Supp. R., pp.20-22.) Mr. Tunstall seeks a new PSI and a new sentencing hearing
with conflict counsel appointed to represent him. (Supp. R. p.22.)
Generally, whether a sentence is illegal or was imposed in an illegal fashion is a question
of law, over which an appellate court exercises free review. State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 84
(2009). Idaho Criminal Rule 35 provides that a district court “may correct a sentence that is
illegal from the face of the record at any time.” I.C.R. 35(a).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held, “the term ‘illegal sentence’ under Rule 35 is
narrowly interpreted as a sentence that is illegal from the face of the record, i.e., does not involve
significant questions of fact or require an evidentiary hearing.” Clements, 148 Idaho at 86.
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“[U]nder Rule 35, a trial court cannot examine the underlying facts of a crime to which a
defendant pled guilty to determine if the sentence is illegal.” Wolfe, 158 Idaho at 65. “Rule 35
inquiries must involve only questions of law—they may not include significant factual
determinations to resolve the merits of a Rule 35 claim. If a district court does inquire and make
significant factual determinations, it exceeds its scope of authority under Rule 35.” Id. Further,
“Rule 35’s purpose is to allow courts to correct illegal sentences, not to reexamine errors
occurring at trial or before the imposition of the sentence.” Id.
The entry of a valid guilty plea ordinarily waives all non-jurisdictional defects. State v.
Kelchner, 130 Idaho 37, 39 (1997). “[J]udgments and orders made without subject matter
jurisdiction are void and ‘are subject to collateral attack, and are not entitled to recognition in
other states under the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution.’” State v.
Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 840 (2011) (quoting Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 626-27
(1978)); see also State v. Mowrey, 91 Idaho 693, 695 (1967); U.S. Catholic Conference v.
Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 77 (1988) (holding “[t]he distinction between
subject-matter jurisdiction and waivable defenses is not a mere nicety of legal metaphysics. It
rests instead on the central principle of a free society that courts have finite bounds of authority,
some of constitutional origin, which exist to protect citizens from the very wrong asserted here,
the excessive use of judicial power. The courts, no less than the political branches of the
government, must respect the limits of their authority.”); State v. Peterson, 149 Idaho 808, 810
(Ct. App. 2010); State v. Taylor, 142 Idaho 30, 31-32 (2005) (holding that upon expiration of the
statutorily authorized time period, the court loses jurisdiction to place the prisoner on probation).
In support of his assertion that the necessary procedure in this case was for the PSI to be
redacted and a neuropsychological report prepared for the resentencing hearing, Mr. Tunstall
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cited to State v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho 820, 823 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding that the order denying
Izaguirre’s request for a neurocognitive evaluation must be reversed and that his sentence must
be vacated and a resentencing be conducted). (Supp. R., p.22.) Mr. Tunstall asserted that he was
not told by counsel that he did not have to speak with the PSI investigator, and his counsel did
not request a neuropsychological evaluation. (Supp. R., pp.20-21.) Mr. Tunstall asserts that his
sentencing, absent these considerations, constituted a fundamental defect which requires resentencing. (Supp. R., p.21.)
In Izaguirre, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and the district court
imposed a life sentence with sixty years fixed. 145 Idaho at 821. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals held that the district court erred by failing to order a neuropsychological evaluation,
concluding that the evaluation,
would likely provide insights that would aid the sentencing court in understanding
possible causes of [Izaguirre’s] behavior, the prospects for helpful treatment, and
his risk of future violence as they may bear upon his culpability, his potential for
rehabilitation, and the duration of sentence that is necessary for retribution,
deterrence, and the protection of society.
Id. 145 Idaho at 823.
The Court of Appeals also identified “[o]ther factors” that led it to “conclude that
Izaguirre’s sentence must be reconsidered.” Izaguirre, 145 Idaho at 824. The Court found that
the district court was unwilling “to consider the articles from professional journals on brain
development that were submitted by Izaguirre in support of his Rule 35 motion,” and that the
district court’s refusal to consider this information was an abuse of discretion. Id.
Although the circumstances presented in his case do not contain facts necessarily on
point with those in Izaguirre where defense counsel in that case requested a comprehensive
neuropsychological evaluation in Mr. Izaguirre’s Rule 35 motion for leniency, Mr. Tunstall
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requests re-sentencing to allow the district court to consider the presumably mitigating
information that would be the product of a neuropsychological evaluation.
Mindful of the Idaho Supreme Court’s decisions in Wolfe, Mr. Tunstall asks that this
Court reverse the denial of his motion and remand the case to the district court with instructions
to grant his Rule 35(a) motion and re-sentence Mr. Tunstall, taking into consideration a redacted
PSI and a neuropsychological evaluation.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Tunstall respectfully requests that this Court remand the matter with instructions to
grant his Rule 35(a) motion and re-sentence Mr. Tunstall.
DATED this 13th day of March, 2019.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 13th day of March, 2019, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
SJC/eas
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